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Dutch drinking water companies now deliver safe affordable water to the entire population,
but this result was not planned. It emerged, rather, from an evolutionary process in which
various pressures on the commons resulted in changes to drinking water systems that
addressed old concerns but uncovered new problems. Our analytical narrative traces this
problem-solution-new problem pattern through four eras in which a common-pool dilemma
is addressed by a private-good solution (1850–1880), a club-good solution (1880–1910)
and a public-good solution (1910–1950) before returning to a private-good solution in the
last 1950–1990 era. Actions, like the dates just given, were not always exact or effective,
as the process was shaped by changing social norms regarding the distribution of costs
and beneﬁts from improved water services. This Dutch history is unique, but its insights
can help improve drinking water services elsewhere.
Keywords: Drinking water; common-pool goods; institutions; public health.
JEL Classiﬁcation: H42, H75, I31, L33, L95, Q53, Q56
1. Introduction
This paper traces the evolution of the Dutch drinking water sector from 1850 to
1990, a period that began with barely any organized service (let alone standards of
good service) and ended with affordable, efﬁcient and good-quality services
accessible to the entire population. Although improvements can be attributed to
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better technologies, rising wealth, and scientiﬁc discoveries, we argue that
changing social priorities played a major role. These priorities matter because the
costs and beneﬁts of drinking water services are shared unevenly throughout
the community. These mismatches can be simple (two families paying the same
ﬁxed fee for different quantities of water) or complex (a sick individual infecting
everyone around them), but their existence means that water should be managed
not as a private good subject to market forces of supply and demand but as a non-
excludable good subject to social priorities, political decisions, and multiple
interdependencies. This common-pool characteristic plays a central role in our
analytical framework in terms of understanding how the Dutch drinking water
sector evolved through four distinct but overlapping “eras” in which the distri-
bution of costs and beneﬁts from universal water services evolved.
But how did we get here, and what question are we trying to answer? We began
with the goal of understanding how the Dutch introduced and used water meters as
a follow-on project to Zetland (2016), which examined the implementation of
water meters after 1989 in England and Wales. In that paper, meters are seen as a
means of reducing water consumption (and thus environmental stress) and allo-
cating system costs based on use rather than (outdated) property values. When we
turned to the Netherlands, our goal was to understand why and how a country with
“too much water” implemented universal metering. Our plan was quickly derailed
when we learned, ﬁrst, that The Hague introduced meters in 1888 to prevent its
naturally ﬁltered dune-water supplies from being depleted, and, second, that pro-
ponents of “water civilization” opposed metering because it would price water use
and thus inhibit water consumption and quality of life — an argument also dis-
cussed in the England and Wales paper. Those facts led to our present research
question, i.e., how did the Dutch bring clean water to everyone given the high cost
of building drinking water systems?
1.1. Objectives and approach
To answer this question, we knew that we would need to explore the tension
between water civilization (treating water as a public good) and charging users for
system costs (treating water as a private good). In our experience, these tradeoffs
are best explored within an analytical framework that allows one to integrate the
subsidies and shared beneﬁts of public goods with the values and externalities of
private goods, i.e., a common-pooled-good framework in which beneﬁts and costs
are shared (Ostrom et al. 1994).
Turning to the question of time, we also knew (from the action/reaction in The
Hague) that the sector’s development would reﬂect changing priorities rather than
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following a continuous path towards a clear goal (Ostrom 1965; Ostrom et al.
2003; Brouwer 2013). After researching those priorities (the analysis of which
makes up the bulk of this paper), we identiﬁed four eras in which one priority
dominated the policies and actions affecting the commons before giving way to a
new priority.
According to our (oversimpliﬁed) model, pressure for change emerges when a
critical mass of citizens decides that beneﬁts and costs from existing services are
unevenly or unfairly distributed among groups. The resulting reforms of the new
era address that imbalance but then reveal the next worst imbalance. This pattern
ﬁts easily into the theory of decreasing marginal returns (and increasing marginal
costs) from service improvements, but it also matches the psychology of rising
expectations. That said, let us note that changing priorities were predominantly
about the means of improving water services more than the ends of having ade-
quate, affordable clean water — a goal towards which the Dutch made steady
advances.
We use an analytical narrative to describe how pressures and responses
developed and interacted (Bates et al. 2000). In each era, the response to the
emergent common-pooled problem involved managing water as a different type
of good (club good, private good, etc.). In each era, the new management
priority lasts until a new common-pooled challenge emerges and the pressure to
address it results in rebalanced priorities. Although we use exact dates, these
eras were not necessarily planned or even clear to people at the time. Trends and
eras, like most human institutions, have blurry boundaries and long tails based
on adoption, adaption, diffusion and confusion. We therefore want readers to
see how multiple inﬂuences, rather than an agreed master plan, produced an
emergent order.
With this structure in mind, we can give a quick overview of our eras. The ﬁrst
era begins in 1850 with concerns over polluted, common-pooled water supplies,
which encourages companies to provide water as a private good. The second era
begins in 1880 when concerns over affordability and infectious diseases leads
municipalities to subsidize and regulate water services as a club good. Develop-
ments in technology and improved health outcomes during that second era result in
pressure to expand services to citizens outside cities, marking the beginning of
third era in 1910 in which information, ﬁnance and regulation promote water
service as a public good. Although access expands during that era, heavy national
spending draws criticism, which leads to the start of a fourth era around 1950 in
which incentives and accounting put more responsibility for spending and use on
drinking water companies (DWCs) and households respectively. This private-good
treatment of costs and water brings us back to 1850 in terms of private-good
Water Civilization: The Evolution of the Dutch Drinking Water Sector
1850012-3
solutions but not to that era’s failures in the commons. By 1990, even the poorest
Dutch could afford adequate clean water. With this overview in mind, let us turn to
the evolutionary model.
2. Methods: Measures, Theory and Evolutionary Dynamics
With our previous work on the tension between efﬁciency (avoiding over-
consumption) and public health (avoiding under-consumption) in England and
Wales and work on the mismatched costs and beneﬁts from desalination plants
(Zetland 2017), we quickly recognized the tradeoffs between metered water and
water civilization. Our observation of diverging opinions gradually merging into
consensus made it easy for us to think in terms of eras and transition phases during
which controversial tradeoffs became acceptable. Our analysis through the lens of
common-pooled water, public health, and/or money helped us identify eras based
on the commons and identify transitions based on changing priorities regarding
different dimensions of the commons (Ostrom et al. 2003). Our use of analytic
narrative does not rely on deductive, ex-ante theory but on an inductive desire to
discover reasonable explanations for various events and actions affecting Dutch
drinking water services. The following sections explain how we measure the im-
portance and impact of clean drinking water as well as explaining how we use
theories of supply, demand, common-pooled goods and institutional evolution in
support of our analysis.
2.1. An overview of the model and its application
A brief summary of these theoretical elements and demonstration of how they
interact across our four eras will help the reader keep the big picture in mind
while exploring details in the sections that follow. Our theory begins by specifying
an objective, or beneﬁt, that is valued sufﬁciently to justify devoting effort
and expense towards its achievement. We use the reduction in infant mortality
as an objective because it is an easily measured proxy for the many beneﬁts of
clean water. Although it would be better to link clean water directly to utility
or other proxies (employment, nutrition, life expectancy, and so on), we lack
comprehensive data for the period of study so we settled on that reduced-form
proxy.
With this objective in mind, we can add basic elements of supply and demand.
On the supply side, we focus on expenditure as a direct determinant of quantity
supplied and technology and knowledge as indirect factors shifting the supply
curve outward (thereby lowering the cost of supplying a given quantity or quality
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of clean drinking water). These shift factors are important because our model
evolves over decades. Demand, likewise, has elements that interact and change
over time. Holding tastes and technology constant, quantity demanded depends on
the price of substitute water sources. Our narrative begins with richer people
paying more for imported, cleaner water while poorer people pay little or nothing
for local, dirty “regular” water. That separating equilibrium changes over time as
knowledge about water quality, rising wealth and changing expectations shift the
demand curve out.
With supply and demand for (clean) drinking water now deﬁned, we can discuss
private and club goods (subject to supply and demand) and common-pooled and
public goods such as subsidies, regulation, knowledge, open-access water sources,
and so on. The under/over-provision of these non-excludable goods drives our
narrative by shifting the supply and demand curves for clean drinking water and
thus equilibrium outcomes affecting the objective (lower infant mortality and all its
correlates). Our last element inﬂuencing outcomes (changing institutions) is
sometimes overlooked, but not in our case. We have abundant evidence of changes
in rules and norms leading to actions that altered the nature and impact of non-
excludable goods and thus supply and demand. We will give a quick overview of
how these elements interact at the end of this section.
2.2. Measures of progress
Figure 1 shows the decline in infant mortality (dying sometime between birth
and one year of age) and decline in the overall death rate between 1840 and
2000. Those declines resulted from many factors — higher incomes, better nu-
trition, and improved healthcare among them — but there is no denying the
importance of more, cleaner water (Cutler et al. 2006). The literature on 19th-
century public health acknowledges that cleaner water and (later) sanitary systems
reduced infectious diseases (cholera, typhoid) spread by fecal contamination of
drinking water sources and/or poor hygiene (typhus) resulting from infrequent
bathing (McKeown and Record 1962; Condran et al. 1984; Cutler and Miller
2005).
Infant mortality is a particularly good indicator of clean water because children
are more vulnerable to infectious diseases and less likely to die in accidents,
violence and so on, but other factors mattered (Prüss-Üstün et al. 2008). The Dutch
worked hard to increase the rate of breast feeding and reduce conditions hospitable
to malaria (mostly complete by the 1870s) before turning to more complex factors
such as cultural habits and maternal health (Wintle 2000; Van Poppel et al. 2012).
Other well-known factors affecting infant mortality, such as hospital delivery and
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inoculation/vaccination, only became important after World War II (Ward 2003;
van Wijhe et al. 2016).
It is appropriate to note that these aggregate data hide variations (some good,
some bad) associated with local customs, natural environments, and differences
between rural and urban life. The southern Dutch province of Zeeland, for ex-
ample, was (in)famous for its poverty, soggy ground, brackish local water, and a
long-standing aversion to breast feeding (Van Poppel et al. 2012). Those inﬂuences
are worth discussing in detailed case studies, but our focus on national, long-term
trends means we ignore most local factors.
2.3. Supply of drinking water
Modern drinking water services collect water from different sources, treat it to
drinking quality, and distribute it through a pressurized system of large trunk pipes
that feed into smaller distribution pipes that connect directly to users. Customers
like these systems because they can consume clean water as easily as opening their
Figure 1. (Color online) Rates of infant mortality (left axis, solid line) and death (right axis, dotted
line) declined from 1850 to the present. For infant mortality, the average annual decline (based on the
average of 5 years of observations before and after each end-point) was 0.67 percent per year between
1850 and 1910, 2.23 percent per year between 1910 and 1939, and 1.84 percent per year between
1950 and 1990
Source: van der Bie and Smits (2001, pp. 14–16).
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taps, but their high ratio of ﬁxed to variable costs (usually 4:1) means that drinking
water systems require massive investments of cash and effort before users can
drink, let alone pay for, a single drop of water (Hanemann 2005).
Those high ﬁxed costs explain why earlier drinking water systems (and many
systems in developing countries today) were less convenient and safe, as con-
sumers were often too poor to guarantee or repay ﬁxed costs. High ﬁxed costs (and
low marginal costs) also help explain how the poor (then and now) choose their
water source. In the best of circumstances, they could pay a small marginal cost (in
time) to collect clean water from natural sources whose existence resulted from
millions of years of “natural capital” investment (Costanza et al. 1997). Those less
lucky would incur higher costs because they would need to haul clean water further
or treat regular water for drinking.
Turning to human-constructed systems, ﬁxed cost investments were sometimes
massive (e.g., Roman aqueducts) but often humble, i.e., wells, barges or pipes that
would provide water at a reasonable cost of time and/or money. Those systems
were common in European cities before the Industrial Revolution, and they are still
common in many poorer parts of the world.
Figure 2 shows this stylized relationship, i.e., how high (low) ﬁxed costs lead
to low (high) marginal costs, holding technology constant. Improvements in
technology, as we shall see in this paper, made it easier to provide cheaper water by
lowering the ﬁxed cost of supply components that previously cost much more.
2.4. Demand for drinking water
Everyone values adequate quantities of affordable clean drinking water, but not
everyone agrees on the deﬁnition of clean or has the money to pay for it. Those two
Figure 2. (Color online) Higher ﬁxed costs or better technology results in lower marginal costs
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facts explain how the value of clean water (and thus the demand curve) is higher
for people who understand the importance of clean water to health and for people
who are rich enough to pay for a higher quality supply; see Fig. 3. People ignorant
of the cost of dirty water and too poor to pay for quality supply will have a lower
value of water, and thus a lower demand curve.
At the beginning of the 19th century, demand for water mostly depended on
personal income and individual taste, but a series of discoveries (discussed in
Section 4.1) linked certain diseases to germs that were spread through contami-
nated drinking water and inadequate hygiene. These discoveries tended to raise
individual willingness to pay for clean drinking water (shifting demand up and
out), but they also created a “social demand” for cleaner water. At the beginning of
the 19th century, the plight of the poor was seen as their private misery occa-
sionally shared by sympathetic outsiders. By 1880, it was clear that their misery
and sickness affected not just neighbors but entire cities. This realization drove
even hard-nosed misanthropes into alliance with the public health advocates and
humanists who had fought for decades to bring clean water to the urban poor.
Those changes in attitudes and values led to actions that occupy the bulk of this
paper’s narrative. The next section will explain how those actions responded to
changing deﬁnitions of the commons and community institutions.
2.5. Drinking water and the commons
Although it is possible to provide clean drinking water as a private good (e.g.,
bottled water), it is difﬁcult to ignore the positive externalities from reliable
drinking water services or the negative externalities resulting from their absence.
Rich or wants clean
Poor and wants regular
$(MV)
Q
Figure 3. (Color online) Demand (value) for clean water is higher for people who know that clean
water is safer and for people rich enough to buy good quality services. The uneducated and poor do
not value clean water, so they consume regular water.
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Those spillover effects into the commons often justify community or government
involvement in the provision of drinking water. Figure 4 will help us think
about these dynamics, as it sets out the four basic types of goods based on their
exclusivity and rivalry.
The key idea in this paper is that drinking water services can be deﬁned as
any of these four goods, depending on circumstances. Water can be a private
good (as discussed just above), a common-pool good (if scarcity is increasing
rivalry and shortage), a club good (if distributed in a network with adequate
demand and cost controls), or a public good (subsidized to the point where
everyone can consume without fear or limit). The ﬁnancing of the water system
can, likewise, be deﬁned using this scheme, as water is private when metered
customers pay tariffs, a club good when funded by local taxes, or a public good
when national transfers cover costs (Winpenny 2003). The right mix of ﬁnancing
sources depends on individual capabilities (tariffs), local prosperity (taxes), and
national priorities (transfers).
Capabilities, prosperities and priorities changed throughout the period discussed
in this paper, but we can rely on a few trends. The ﬁrst is that cumulative expe-
rience and investment ease further expansion of drinking water supplies. We can
thus see how initial investments by DWCs selling water as a private good might
make it easier for other DWCs to think about providing water as a club good and
perhaps even a public good. This progress will not be automatic, as the steps to
non-rivalry and then non-exclusion bring, respectively, greater subsidies and po-
litical complexities (Hanemann 2005). Financial worries can be reduced by
replacing transfers with tariffs, but that shift is only feasible when customers have
adequate income. Figure 5 shows how only the rich can afford water supplied with
Excludable Non-excludable
Rival
Non-rival
Private good
Club good
Common-pool
good
Public good
Figure 4. Goods are deﬁned by their properties of (non-)rivalry and (non-)excludability. Derived
from Cornes and Sandler (1986)
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low technology or low ﬁxed costs as well as how improved technology or higher
ﬁxed cost investments can lower prices to the point where the poor can also afford
to pay. Our story will start and end with this ﬁgure, as the situation in 1850 looked
like the equilibrium for the rich, while the situation in 1990 — due to cumulative
investments and technological progress — allowed the poor (and everyone else) to
consume adequate quantities of clean water.
2.6. Changing institutions
Institutions generically refer to formal rules and informal norms. In the water
sector, they can refer to technological capabilities, professional practices, customer
habits, and so on. In the Netherlands, institutions aid cooperation in the manage-
ment of the commons. The Dutch “polder” model of collaboration is named after
the polders formed when communities cooperated to build dikes that would allow
land to be reclaimed from open water and/or protected from ﬂooding. Nowadays,
the Dutch say they are “poldering” when they are engaged in multi-faceted, multi-
party negotiations on how to share private costs in the course of creating social
gains (Randeraad and Wolffram 2001; Geels 2006; Brouwer 2013). It is therefore
easy to see the value of the polder model to water management, whose challenges
are well-known:
The omnipresence of ﬁxed costs and surface water supply creates
a classic economic problem of cost allocation which has no
satisfactory technical solution. The extraordinary capital intensity
and longevity of surface water supply infrastructure, and a
Low FC/Tech
High FC/Tech
Rich
Poor
$(MC, MV)
Q
Figure 5. (Color online) The poor can only afford water when networks have high ﬁxed costs
investment or better technology
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predominance of economies of scale, create a need for collective
action in the provision and ﬁnancing of water supply that simply
does not arise with most other commodities
— (Hanemann 2005, p. 87).
Hanemann cites Olson (1965) in explaining the difﬁculty of agreeing on
voluntary collective action to overcome selﬁsh individual choices. The Dutch were
aware of those challenges, but it still took them decades to agree on who would
pay for improvements in drinking water supply, aided or stymied, respectively,
by the presence or lack of social norms, collective identity, and acknowledged
interdependence.
How did change occur? Stachowiak (2009) describes “six theories about how
policy change happens” in an attempt to impose frameworks on processes that are
— by their nature — oversimpliﬁed yet complex, directed yet diverted, planned
yet interrupted by external forces (Hayek 1945; Scott 1998). With that caveat in
mind, we can use her brief to pick a few relevant theories of change, i.e., “policy
window theory” and “prospect theory.”
Policy window theory identiﬁes three streams in the policy process, i.e., pro-
blems with social conditions, policies aimed at those problems, and the national
mood that collects attention in support of those policies. In this paper, these three
streams often converge on the role and importance of drinking water services.
Turning to prospect theory (originating in Kahneman et al. (1990) and subse-
quent work), framing of an issue, options for addressing it, and inconsistent
decisions all interact in a process that seems chaotic but eventually moves towards
an objectionably worthy goal. In this paper, prospect theory explains how growing
scientiﬁc knowledge and technical skills could deliver a water quality solution
based on the framed need to protect or support the commons associated with public
health and poorer citizens, respectively.
Stachowiak (2009) sought to explain how change happens, but change is not
automatic. Cockerill and Armstrong (2015) explore the “wicked” aspect to water
management problems that result from complex causes, require collective action to
address, and depend on cooperation among groups with different needs, opinions
and capabilities. These factors explain the lack of clear direction at the beginning
of our narrative, when variations in laws and technologies and differing opinions
on the need for action and role of different actors meant that disagreement dom-
inated consensus. Luckily for the Dutch, those counter-productive elements re-
ceded as prosperity reduced policy-window-theory-related constraints and
experience reduced the prospect-theory-related uncertainty over the costs and
beneﬁts of various actions (Brouwer 2013).
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The Dutch built environment also plays an important role in our narrative. The
Netherlands was one of the world’s most urbanized countries in the 17th century.
In 1675, over 40% of the population lived in settlements of 2,500 or more (a share
that persisted until 1850), but the division between larger and smaller urbaniza-
tions changed as the population share of cities of 20,000 or more declined from
about 21% in 1750 to as low as 17% in 1815 before rising back to 21% in 1840
and growing steadily thereafter (de Vries 1985). The growth of larger cities was
driven by the Industrial Revolution, expanding railway networks, and regional
integration that pulled economic power from smaller towns (2,500 or so) and
eventually rural areas (de Vries 1985; Kooij 1988). This urbanization trend
strengthened in the twentieth century. Between 1889 and 1971, larger cities grew
by an average of 2.4% per year while national population grew by 0.8% (de Groot
et al. 2011). Rising urban populations increased demand for improved drinking
water systems, but their economic output provided the means to pay for them. By
similar logic, falling relative population in smaller towns and rural areas meant
their inhabitants (who were also poorer) would ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to pay for
their own drinking water systems (de Groot et al. 2011). These trends matter for
two reasons. First, the reality and perception of a water quality gap can further
exacerbate the separation between wealthier areas (often cities) and poorer areas.
Second, the presence of a gap creates social and political pressure to help under-
provisioned regions. The strength of this pressure — and effectiveness of any
response it triggers — depends on how the clean water deﬁcit is perceived.
The next section will explain how those perceptions changed over the four eras of
our analysis.
2.7. A brief summary of how the model evolves
In the sections above, we explained how supply and demand for clean water as a
private good could be inﬂuenced by perceptions and impacts of clean water on the
commons of public health, government ﬁnances, and so on. In this section, we will
use this model framework to build a foundation on which the details of the four
main eras can be imposed, organized and understood.
Our workhorse structure for describing a situation and its (in)stability is Fig. 4,
which shows how rivalry and excludability (or their absence) interact to deﬁne
four types of goods. We use this structure throughout the paper to investigate how
clean water’s nature as a good changes under various pressures and how those
changes, in turn, make it easier to predict what response or problem might come
next. Figure 6 summarizes the moves that deﬁne our eras, which we will brieﬂy
describe here.
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Our story begins before 1850, when surface and shallow groundwaters were
clean enough for most Dutch to collect their drinking water from local sources. Our
ﬁrst era begins as that situation is threatened by pollution that changed the nature
of local waters from public good (adequate clean water) to common-pooled good
(scarce clean water) in congested cities. Residents faced with dirty water could
continue drinking it (suffering the consequences), but others secured “private”
water through their own means (e.g., rainwater cisterns) or by purchasing water
from enterprises founded to supply quality. Figure 6 indicates this move in the
1850–1880 era with the arrow going from common-pooled good (top right) to
private good (top left).
Most regions in the world have experienced this transition from clean to polluted
communal water sources. Pollution can come from industrial, agricultural or resi-
dential sources, but the resulting choice is always the same: drink polluted water or
ﬁnd a protected (private-good) source. Private-good sources can be provided via
bottles, personal ﬁlters, or private companies delivering cleaner water to paying
customers. The mix of solutions depends on willingness to pay, technology and
business models, but they are also small scale and ineffective in protecting
public health.
Concerns over the commons of public health led to the next era (1880–1910) in
which clean water services were offered to urban citizens at subsidized prices as a
means of protecting cities from cholera and other water-borne diseases. In this era,
urban water services are offered as a club good to all residents (i.e., without rivalry
regarding supply or payment) as a means of promoting public health, water civi-
lization and general prosperity. This era had many debates over subsidies and
effectiveness, but the technology made it cheaper to provide water and research
supported the value of clean drinking water to the community.
1850–1880/1950–1990
18
80
–1
91
0
1910–1950
Figure 6. (Color online) Our four eras can also be deﬁned in terms of how the responses to pressures
on the commons turned clean drinking water into other types of good
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That value lead to a further push to provide clean water to citizens outside
wealthier cities and a willingness to spend heavily on subsidized services. The
1910–1950 era brought clean water to smaller and smaller towns. This move
ignored the common-pooled (rival) aspect of budgetary limits in favor of providing
water as a public good, as shown by the arrow in Fig. 6. (That choice led to a push
for accountability after 1950, as explained below.)
These two eras (or steps in the provision of water services) have also occurred
elsewhere. Most higher income countries have clean urban water supplies, but this
club good is not provided to urban slums in many poorer countries. The second
step (to nationwide clean water provision) is less common, for good and bad
reasons. In some countries, remote or rural water supplies are clean enough for
small-scale or self provision. In other countries, the step is necessary (water is
polluted) but not taken because rural people are too poor, politically irrelevant or
ignorant of their danger (e.g., Bangladesh before arsenic poisoning was uncov-
ered). In the Dutch case, the move to provide clean urban water was driven by a
fear of widespread cholera while the move to provide water across the nation was
driven by falling costs on the supply side and rising expectations from citizens
newly allowed to vote.
The ﬁnal stage — moving from common-pool to private good in the 1950–
1990 era — is relatively easy to understand as the result of a drive to align
incentives for consumers and water utilities (“privatizing the commons”) in a time
when the government was still spending a lot of money (especially in the post-war
rebuilding period), but citizens were better able to pay for good water services.
This private-good treatment was less controversial than it was in 1850–1880 be-
cause improvements in the sector’s institutions, cost-structure and governance
improved the beneﬁt-cost ratio for spending at the national, utility and household
level (Brouwer 2013). These same factors mean that it is often possible to have
good quality water service in most countries in the 21st century. Why does reality
fall short of possibility? In some countries, it is difﬁcult to convince voters and
users that they should pay the full cost of services (Zetland and Gasson 2012). In
others, politicians and managers pursue short-term goals by under-pricing water or
under-investing in reliability, respectively (Zetland 2017).
These examples should clarify the basic model we are using to explain the
evolution of the Dutch drinking water sector.
The next ﬁve sections will test, dispute and support this model by testing
theories of supply and demand, goods and institutions against historic facts, per-
spectives and decisions. The narrative begins with emerging concerns regarding
the impact of dirty water on the public health commons and moves through four
eras of conﬂicting priorities over different commons of water, health, money,
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voting and land value. History moves in a straight line, but institutions evolve in
response to the (sometimes conﬂicting) inﬂuences of changing technology, mo-
rality information, and community identity. Our analytical narrative might clarify
how the Dutch struggled (and succeeded) in providing adequate, affordable clean
drinking water to all, but it will not answer every question nor ﬁt every event.
3. Increasing Pressure on the Commons (Pre-1850)
Most Dutch settlements were founded near dunes or rivers to gain access to cleaner
water via small-scale methods that worked well for at least a thousand years.
Amsterdam’s fresh water access was much worse, but the city grew with the
success of its port and trading activities. The ﬁrst known instance of selling water
in the Netherlands dates from 1480 when Amsterdam’s beer brewers stopped using
water from local canals and began importing cleaner water from the nearby
Haarlemmermeer (Haarlem lake), which they sold alongside beer. In 1786, the
Fresh Water Society began importing water to Amsterdam on ships to sell
for proﬁt. Its ﬂeet grew to 44 large and 246 smaller ships within a decade (Groen
Jr. 1978).
Those who could not afford to buy imported water made do with dirtier local
supplies, but increasing urban population and rising discharges of pollution re-
duced the quality of those common-pool waters, leading to conditions that “would
remind the hygienist of today [1949] of the Middle Ages” (van Marle 1949, p. 6).
In rural areas, groundwater also became saline as irrigation imported salts from
rivers and/or increased salt-water intrusion.
These problems (turning clean public-good water into common-pooled dirty
water) invited small-scale private-good solutions. In low-lying cities, people col-
lected rain water in cisterns because groundwater was often dirty. In cities at higher
elevations, people drew groundwater from private or shared wells following rules
that rationed water and maintained the well. Access to a well in Arnhem, for
example, was limited to those who paid a subscription (Wijmer 1992).
The wealthy could afford to pay for cisterns, wells or water deliveries, but other
citizens could not. The gradual and then accelerating decline of water quality in
congested areas converted public-good, clean water into common-pool, polluted
water. This situation attracted entrepreneurs hoping to sell water as a private good.
It also caught the attention of public health advocates who pushed for government
interventions to provide clean water as a public good.
Amsterdam’s troubles previewed the future of other Dutch cities, but its
challenges were familiar in other European cities. According to Goldsmith and
Carter (2016), London’s private companies started competing to deliver water in
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1582. Many companies went bankrupt because they could not recover their ﬁxed
costs, but their assets helped other ﬁrms succeed. Others survived with additional
cash from investors, protection from aristocratic supporters, the ﬁnancial security
of 500-year leases on water sources and infrastructure, and the eager participation
of investors ﬂush with proﬁts from privateering or colonial exploitation.
Surviving ﬁrms often took decades to repay debts but paid generous dividends
thereafter.
London’s private companies provided water of varying quality and reliability,
but they charged one-third less than porters bringing water from the Thames. Their
competitive advantage grew over time as the Thames got dirtier and their real price
of service fell (the nominal service price of one pound per year did not change
between 1582 and 1852). Steady revenue on the supply side and increasing
affordability on the demand side led to an increase in quantities delivered over
time, even if the quality of service did not improve by much. In 1810, a “water
war” broke out as newcomers fought for market share. They introduced ﬁltering
and settling systems to improve water quality and delivered continuous pressurized
supply through cast-iron pipes. The wars were good for customers accustomed to
receiving river water through wooden pipes a few times per week, but expensive
for companies. The end of the wars in 1817 resulted in price increases, but higher
proﬁts did not last.
We will return to this story in a few pages, as it parallels events in the
Netherlands, but ﬁrst we need to catch up with Amsterdam, where deteriorating
water quality was creating a market opportunity to sell water as a private good.
4. Avoiding Pollution via Private Goods (1850–1880)
After nearly 200 years of ebb and ﬂow, Amsterdam’s population started to in-
crease around 1830. In 1860, it set an historic high that kept rising, from 220,000
in 1850 to 520,000 in 1900. Unprecedented urbanization increased population
density and the problems associated with crowding across the country. In 1848
and 1849, 22,460 urban Dutch died from cholera outbreaks. Not everyone agreed
on the cause of cholera outbreaks — some blamed “miasmas” (polluted air),
others ﬁlthy living conditions — but wealthier people gave more attention to their
hygiene and water quality (Houwaart 1991). Their demand for clean water
attracted entrepreneurs who thought they could beat the Fresh Water Society’s
water-by-boat model with pipes that could deliver continuous supply. The lawyer
Jacob van Lennep and engineer C.D. Vaillant founded the ﬁrst Drinking Water
Company (DWC) in the Netherlands. The Dune Water Company (De Duinwater
Maatschappij) relied on British investors and engineers to build a 23 km pipe to
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bring dune-ﬁltered water from Bloemendaal to Amsterdam (Groen Jr. 1978;
Wijmer 1992).
On Friday, 9 December 1853, the mayor and aldermen of Amsterdam granted
the Dune Water Company a permit to start operating on the condition that they
would charge half the price of the Fresh Water Society, or one cent per bucket
(probably 10 l) — the equivalent of €10/m3 in 2017 (Wijmer 1992). They sold
4,450 buckets on Monday, 12 December. By Friday, their sales had increased to
10,575 buckets per day (Groen Jr. 1978). By 1856, Amsterdammers could buy
water from 56 Dune Water Company taps. By 1860 it became clear that ships
could not compete with pipes, and the last water-ship sailed in 1870 (Wijmer 1992;
Geels 2005). In 1856, a second private DWC started in Den Helder, where ships
departing to the Dutch Indes (Indonesia) took on food and water before departing
on their long voyages (Bijl 1924; Geels 2005).
These early ventures took advantage of the sand dunes as natural ﬁlters for
removing solids and killing bacteria and viruses. Figure 7 shows the importance of
“dune water” over the past 150 years. Dutch DWCs currently get roughly 70% and
Figure 7. Water sources were primarily from groundwater, with the remaining supply coming
equally from dune water (later supplemented by “inﬁltrated” surface water) and surface water
Source: Leeﬂang (1974).
Water Civilization: The Evolution of the Dutch Drinking Water Sector
1850012-17
30% of their supply from dune/ground- and surface sources, respectively
(VEWIN 2015).
4.1. Demands to protect public health
The piped water business was successful at solving the problem of dirty water in
the commons for those who could afford to buy private water, but those who were
excluded still got sick. The lack of clear knowledge (or understanding) on the germ
theory of disease made it difﬁcult for people to agree on the role or value of clean
water. The upper classes distanced themselves from the dirtier, poorer classes by
embracing water civilisation, and their pursuit of personal hygiene created markets
for clean water and private baths (Geels 2005). The working classes, for their part,
saw purchased water as an extravagance in comparison to the free, but dirty, water
they took from canals (Schuursma 1949; Wijmer 1992). The upper classes sup-
ported public interventions to help the poor, reasoning that “water civilization”
would make up for their “deﬁciencies in character and behavior” (Geels 2005,
p. 384). The middle classes mimicked upper class attitudes, supporting interven-
tions and attending “housewife schools” where personal hygiene was synonymous
with modern living (Geels 2005). Similar beliefs were held in London, where the
upper classes assumed that high rates of sickness among the poor reﬂected ﬁlthy
habits. In fact, much of the problem could be traced to the lack of water supply on
the upper ﬂoors of buildings where the poor lived — a deﬁciency resulting from
weak water pressure rather than an aversion to cleanliness (Cockerill and Arm-
strong 2015).
The cholera outbreaks of 1848–1849 in both Britain and the Netherlands led
some people to seek cleaner water, but John Snow’s publications on the con-
nection between fecal-contaminated water and cholera in 1849 and 1855 greatly
increased public interest in public health and clean, communal water supplies
(Klostermann 2003). Citizens supporting public health and clean drinking
water for all — the so-called “hygienists” — published pamphlets on hygienic
standards during epidemics and gave advice on lifestyles to the aristocratic and
working classes (’t Hart 1990; Houwaart 1991; Wijmer 1992). Besides ap-
pealing to man’s better nature, they also argued that the public and private
beneﬁts of better drinking water systems would exceed the costs of subsidies.
These ideas are only slowly entering global consciousness (see, e.g., Ciriacy-
Wantrup (1961); UNICEF (2009)), so it is no surprise that many saw subsidies
as wasteful (Geels 2006). In the meantime, advances in the scientiﬁc under-
standing of the germ theory of disease lent additional support to the hygienists’
claims. Pasteur proposed bacteria in 1862. Cohn and Koch made them visible in
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1880, and Koch identiﬁed the bacteria linked to tuberculosis and cholera in
1883 (Houwaart 1991).
In 1866, 19,691 Dutch died in another cholera outbreak, and the Dutch
government ordered an investigation into the relationship between drinking water
and cholera (’t Hart 1990). In 1868, the Commission for Research on Drinking
Water (Commissie tot Onderzoek van Drinkwater) published its Report to the King,
which concluded that the hygienists were right, i.e., that cholera was spread by
polluted drinking water (Commissie tot Onderzoek van Drinkwater 1868). Their
report convinced politicians of the need for clean drinking water, but there was still
no consensus on whether government should subsidize waterworks. Members of
Parliament asked if the government planned to act on the ﬁndings (Tweede Kamer
1869a). The government replied that Article 135 of the 1851 Municipality Law
delegated responsibility for public health to cities (Tweede Kamer 1869b). Some
cities ignored this call to action while others embraced the conclusion that water’s
impact on public health meant that supply could not just be left to the market and
the treatment of water as a private good. It was necessary to provide water as a club
good to all urban residents.
5. Supporting Public Health via Club-Goods (1880–1910)
The push to distribute cleaner water to urban citizens was immediately slowed by
concerns over the high ﬁxed costs of building systems that would be able to deliver
large volumes at low prices (recall the discussion in Section 2.3). Larger cities had
two advantages in this regard, as they were able to build larger systems with
greater economies of scale and then spread the costs of those systems among a
larger population. Figure 8 shows the “strong correlation between the size of cities
and the year that piped water was implemented” (Bijl 1924; Geels 2005, p. 380).
This correlation was neither causal nor automatic, as most municipalities wanted to
avoid going into debt to ﬁnance the construction of water supply systems. They
avoided debt by granting concessions to private investors who would build and
operate waterworks under government regulation (Putto 1949). With that temporal
question out of the way, most cities sought a supply large enough to meet basic
needs, i.e., networks providing water as a club good that would be paid for by a
combination of tariffs on users (often paid by landlords) and local taxes on property
owners.
Not every city could offer attractive terms. After failing to attract private
investors, Rotterdam and The Hague decided to ﬁnance their systems with taxes,
and their DWCs began operating in 1874 (Bijl 1924; Nordlohne 1963; van den
Noort and Blauw 2000). In the case of Rotterdam, the decision to move ahead was
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motivated more by the need to ﬂush its trash- and excrement-clogged canals than a
desire for clean drinking water — although the two were related (van den Noort
and Blauw 2000). The Hague had “solved” its canal problem by ﬁlling and cov-
ering some of its canals, but an 1867 report advised the municipality that it should
start importing clean drinking water from the dunes at Scheveningen (Bijl 1924).
The resulting increase in water use and discharge forced the city to build more
canals for ﬂushing and drainage, but that system was operationally inadequate and
politically unpopular with downstream neighbors, so the city opened the ﬁrst
Dutch sewerage system in 1893 (Geels 2006).
Figure 8. The negative correlation between population (vertical axis, in thousands) and establish-
ment of a DWC
Source: Jäger (1963).
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Private DWCs began operations in Leiden in 1878, Nijmegen in 1879,
Groningen in 1881, Dordrecht in 1882, and Utrecht in 1883 (Günther 1934; Geels
2005). Municipalities helped stimulate demand for services to reduce the spread of
contagious diseases and keep their cities attractive to the growing middle class
(Wijmer 1992). Maastricht minimized the maintenance of public water pumps to
increase demand for DWC water, while Breda spread oil in its canals to reduce
consumption of canal water and reduce the risk of a cholera outbreak (Cillekens
et al. 1988; Groeneveld 1994). By 1900, the Netherlands had 60 DWCs, most of
which were private (Klostermann 2003; Blokland 1999). These efforts matched the
trend in other industrialized cities (e.g., Paris, New York, London, Berlin) that were
issuing regulations, subsidizing costs, and sometimes buying out private operators
in an effort to expand services and improve quality (Geels 2005; Prasad 2007).
Increased municipal attention brings us back to London (via Goldsmith and
Carter (2016)), which we last saw emerging from the water wars of 1810–1817. Its
eight private DWCs quickly raised their prices to recover the cost of heavy
investments made during the wars, but those moves ran into increasing opposition
as politicians and scientists connected the dots between overcrowded, unsanitary
slums and disease outbreaks. The cholera outbreak of 1848 and John Snow’s
discovery of the connection between cholera and polluted water from the Broad
Street pump in one of London’s poorer neighborhoods led to regulations on water
quality and pricing (1852), oversight of services and ﬁnances (1871), and water
supply as a condition of dwelling’s “habitability” (1891). These regulations low-
ered prices and improved services to a certain degree, but the industry’s high
proﬁts (many paid the maximum-allowed dividend of 10% for decades) and close
connections to Members of Parliament (MPs) protected the companies from
stronger regulation. It was not until 1880 that MPs were prohibited from over-
seeing DWCs in which they held shares. That change showed both the difﬁculty in
overcoming vested interests (lobbying against such conﬂicts of interest had begun
in 1821) as well as how momentum for change had grown. In 1902 all eight private
water companies were purchased and merged into the Metropolitan Water Board
for London. The city’s takeover was not a ﬁnancial success — private owners were
overpaid and charges were set too low to pay for service improvements — but it
eventually resulted in better service at lower prices.1
London’s experience overlaps with the Dutch experience in a few interesting
ways. London had piped water (1582) long before Amsterdam (1853) but both
cities implemented regulations in the latter half of the nineteenth century and took
1The privatizations of 1989 seem to indicate that this trend reversed sometime in the next 87 years,
but that debate is beyond the scope of this paper.
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over their water suppliers around 1900. Amsterdam’s lag on the supply side can be
explained by its lower population, local water sources, and differing institutions,
but their overlap on regulation and ownership can probably be traced to the
growing realization that water supply played a crucial role in the commons, i.e.,
protecting public health and promoting quality of life. Turning to technology
and ﬁnancing, it is also helpful to remember that much of the early investment
into Dutch drinking water networks came from Britain, where systems and
operators were more sophisticated but also where investors enjoying fat proﬁts
were looking abroad for new opportunities. They eventually learned that they
would not make the same proﬁts in the Netherlands (the government set prices
lower and demanded better service), but they had already transferred much
knowledge and wealth by then. The bottom line is that London and Amsterdam
pursued policies appropriate for their differing conditions but then converged after
1850 as it became obvious that clean drinking water was beneﬁcial to the com-
munity as a whole.
We can also draw on Reghizzi (2016) to examine how Paris dealt with similar
issues. The city had private DWCs delivering water around 1800, but their un-
derinvestment, the city’s stinginess with subsidies, and weak regulation led to
health outcomes and life expectancy that was worse than in the countryside. The
impetus for public investment and regulation came from Haussmann’s desire to
replace the city’s dirty Seine water supply with clean imported water that would
complement his grand plans. Haussmann’s push helped the city’s wealthier resi-
dents, but the poor continued to use cheaper Seine water (distribution systems
carried water from different sources). The result — mortality in poorer districts
was two-to-three times the average — can perhaps best be explained by the city’s
reluctance to invest tax revenues into the water system and preference for
private operators that could operate without subsidies. Local leaders appeared to
think that regulations requiring water and wastewater services in poorer neigh-
borhoods were intervention enough (Kesztenbaum and Rosenthal 2012).
These comparisons support the conclusion that the Dutch, for all their faults and
hesitancy, were moving reasonably quickly to extend adequate, affordable water to
all urban residents, i.e., members of the club. In 1901, the national government
passed a Health Care Law requiring municipalities to consult a Health Care
Commission regarding large-scale housing developments (the dominant source of
new urban housing at the time) and a Housing Law requiring municipalities to
ensure the provision of drinking water to new and existing homes (Günther 1934;
Leeﬂang 1974; Geels 2005). Regulations requiring waterworks connections for
new homes resulted in new distribution networks for entire neighborhoods and
lower connection charges for homeowners (Klostermann 2003).
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5.1. Demands to serve all citizens
These developments reﬂected a gradual consensus on the importance of shared
beneﬁts from water systems, but private DWCs focussed more on the private-good
aspects of their service (clean water to paying customers) and less on providing
public goods (e.g., technology standards or information) or protecting common-
pool goods (e.g., public health or water sources). Those practices were acceptable
in most Dutch cities in the 19th century, as they followed a “small government”
model at the behest of the minority of citizens whose wealth or income gave them
the right to vote. This model was gradually overturned as the voting franchise
expanded from 29% of the male population in 1887 to all adult men and women by
1919. New voters demanded greater ﬁnancial and technical resources for the im-
provement and expansion of water and wastewater networks that would serve
everyone (Geels 2006).
Popular support for the provision of public goods was complemented by sci-
entiﬁc discoveries that highlighted the value of clean water and engineering
improvements that lowered the cost of provision. The Second Dutch Congress on
Public Health Regulation, held in 1897, suggested that drinking water should be
delivered through pipes, treated for clarity and hardness, and carry “non-harmful”
concentrations of lead and other contaminants (Leeﬂang 1974). Participants at the
Congress also pushed for government subsidies to municipalities unable to afford
their own waterworks (Leeﬂang 1974). A mix of private and public DWCs
founded the Association for Dutch Waterworks Interests (Vereniging voor Water-
leidingbelangen in Nederland, or VWN) in 1899 (Klostermann 2003). VWN (later
VEWIN) collected, created and distributed knowledge on geology, hydrology,
materials, technologies, water quality and so forth (van Marle 1949).2
The sector’s lack of knowledge and experience sometimes led to mistakes. The
Second Congress’s emphasis on clear rather than safe water meant that “best
practices” would allow for cheaper but dangerous lead pipes rather than safer
copper pipes (Leeﬂang 1974). VWN developed its own voluntary water quality
norms in 1909. The government did not issue mandatory quality standards until the
ﬁrst Drinking Water law was passed in 1957, at which point local authorities could
be sued by government health inspectors for failing to meet standards (Geels
2005). The national government set up bodies to conduct research and provide
2VWN was renamed Koninklijke VWN (Royal VWN) and then Koninklijk Nederlands Waternetwerk,
or Royal Dutch Water Network (KNW). In 1953 KNW became Vereniging van Exploitanten van
Waterleidingbedrijven in Nederland (VEWIN), or Association of Water Company Operators in the
Netherlands), which later changed its name — but not its acronym — to the Vereniging van
Drinkwaterbedrijven in Nederland, or Dutch Association of Water Companies.
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advice to government, provinces, municipalities and water companies: the State
Commission for Drinking Water Systems in 1910 and Netherlands Institute of
Drinking Water Supply (Rijksinstituut voor de Drinkwatervoorziening (RID)) in
1913 (Leeﬂang 1974). RID played a major role over the coming decades in pro-
viding free technical advice and subsidizing system improvements. These changes
and interventions signaled the beginning of the next era in which water services
would be treated as a public good.
6. Serving Citizens via Public Goods (1910–1950)
Expanding popular suffrage led governments on all levels to spend more on
those who had little economic power but now possessed political power.3 Only
15,000 guilders were dedicated to constructing waterworks in 1910, but 420,000
guilders were spent in 1949 — an increase from €166,000 to €1,815,000 in
constant 2016 values (De Glee 1949; Putto 1949). In 1910, the national budget
included “costs of preparing for the anticipated need for drinking water” for the
ﬁrst time (Tweede Kamer 1909). From 1910 and into the 1930s, the national
government provided interest-free loans (rentelooze voorschotten) and revenue risk
guarantees (verleende risico-garanties) to DWCs that were expanding into un-
derserved areas (Jannink 1938; Geels 2006). In 1913, Amsterdam became the
second Dutch city (after The Hague in 1893) to install sewerage, and all cities with
more than 50,000 inhabitants had sewer systems by 1938 (Geels 2006). The cost of
these new and expanded systems was high but bearable: GDP per capita grew by
2.16% annually between 1913 and 1929 (van Ark and de Jong 1996). Figure 9
shows how these combined inﬂuences spread drinking water services across the
Netherlands.
The share of DWCs under public control grew as stronger service regulations
increased costs faster than revenues, straining ﬁnances at private DWCs that were
unwilling — or perhaps unable — to expand to achieve the scale economies
consistent with regulations and aspirations that water be provided as a public good.
Blokland (1999) tells the typical story of the Leeuwarder Waterleiding Maat-
schappij (LWM), which did well in the ﬁrst few years after its founding in 1889 but
started losing money on heavy demand, leading to the cancellation of its con-
cession in 1921 and merger of its operations into a provincial DWC co-founded
3Members of the popular chamber of the Dutch Parliament (De Tweede Kamer) are elected by
proportional representation, with the country as a single district. This system means that even the
hundredth most popular candidate will get a seat in parliament.
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with eight other municipalities. Other examples of municipal takeovers are
Amsterdam in 1896, Maastricht and Groningen in 1918 and Arnhem in 1939
(Schaap and Seebach 1985; Cillekens et al. 1988; Klostermann 2003).
The LWM example typiﬁes how provinces used scale to bring services to less-
populated areas but also how they used regulation and subsidies to achieve their
goals. In 1919, the provincial government of North Holland used its veto over
DWC operations to encourage consolidation, and other provinces followed its
lead (Leeﬂang 1974). These interventions often resulted in public take overs of
private DWCs, as the provinces did not mind merging loss-making with proﬁtable
DWCs. The resulting larger entities had market power, but they were regulated
Figure 9. DWC service areas spread to less densely populated areas in these maps from 1899, 1924,
1939 and 1949
Source: Leeﬂang (1974).
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(and subsidized) in order to provide cheaper services to more people. The number
of private DWCs dropped below 50% of the total by 1910 and fell throughout the
twentieth century as municipal and provincial governments established new DWCs
and took over private DWCs (Blokland 1999).
Figure 10 shows how the number of drinking water companies rose by 250%
between 1900 and 1940, peaking at over 200 DWCs. Assuming that each DWC
had ﬁxed costs, it is clear that the drive to bring water to more customers may have
encouraged municipalities to support their own residents and workers rather than
cooperate to build at scale. The resulting cost inefﬁciencies resulted in national and
provincial pressures to save money and achieve scale via mergers (Klostermann
2003). Figure 10 shows how the number of DWCs rose while service expansion
was emphasized and then fell as the priority switched to rationalization and
efﬁciency.
Figure 10. The number of DWCs rose steadily before peaking at 231 in 1938. the lower trace shows
the total count of provincial water companies, which rose as they absorbed smaller DWCs
Sources: Leeﬂang (1974); Klostermann (2003).
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6.1. Demands to waste less money and water
The beginning of the end of this era is not visible in outcomes (Fig. 1 shows
that infant mortality continued to drop) but in concerns over excessive spending
in a Depression economy in which GDP per capita was shrinking by 0.89% per
year between 1930 and 1938 — and throughout WWII (van Ark and de Jong
1996).
Some observers focussed on water waste as a sign of moral decay. According to
van Nievelt (1949, p. 113), “beneﬁcial usage of water is a blessing for the com-
munity and the individual. Wasting, on the other hand, is a symptom of a disease
that needs to be fought.” Such thoughts reﬂected a tension between treating water
as a public good contributing to water civilization and worrying about over-
exploitation of commons of money and water under lax management.
The criticism of excessive water consumption arose from the lack of water
meters for domestic use. (Industrial customers were usually metered but it is not
clear if they paid to subsidize household users — or vice versa.) Water meters were
not widely used due to their high cost (as high as 15–30% of a DWC’s total
expenses) and tendency to reduce quantity demanded (and thus water civilization)
by introducing a marginal price on water consumption (RvD 1919). Proponents of
water civilisation preferred tariffs based on wealth (imputed from the number of
bedrooms) and spending to increase supply rather than spending on meters that
would suppress demand (van Royen 1938; Groen Jr. 1978). The Hague was the
exception to this rule — recall that it installed watermeters in 1888 — because it
needed to reduce demand for its limited supply of dune water, but few cities
followed its lead (Bijl 1924; van Royen 1938). These norms fed worries about
wasteful water consumption and excessive public spending — concerns that led to
a post-war era in which water is treated as a private good to be managed by
corporate DWCs and consumed by metered customers.
7. Internalizing Costs via Private Goods (1950–1990)
The post-war reconstruction of the Netherlands (De Wederopbouw) brought annual
GDP-per-capita growth of 3.7% between 1947 and 1973 (van Ark and de Jong
1996). Increasing wages and tax revenues made it easier for the government to
push more responsibility onto utilities and users (treating drinking water as a
private good) but also made it easier for the welfare state to provide ﬁnancing and
regulation (as public goods). Thus, we see a simultaneous increase in government
spending with a push for local responsibility. DWCs were forced to consolidate
and improve their services while balancing their budgets. Customers had to pay for
their metered water use. These policies — by converting common-pooled into
Water Civilization: The Evolution of the Dutch Drinking Water Sector
1850012-27
private goods — changed incentives and perceptions around waste. The next
paragraphs will explain the policies’ results.
Many public DWCs had acted as independent corporate entities with their
own balance sheets and proﬁt & loss statements since the 1920s. This structure
allowed them to invest revenues and depreciate costs more freely than if they
had shared accounts with the city governments that owned them. This system
limited loss-making behavior, but DWCs had weak incentives to improve their
services and no incentive (and probably no legal ability) to grow to a more
efﬁcient scale. The resulting excess of DWCs offering costly service explains why
national and provincial governments pressured DWCs to merge. The 1957 Wa-
terworks Law encouraged DWCs to serve more customers as well as merge their
operations (Leeﬂang 1974). The government offered a subsidy of 80 million
guilders towards bringing drinking water connections to 93% of the population
(Tweede Kamer 1955). That spending (0.66% of 1960’s GDP of 12 billion
guilders) represented a much larger share of GDP than today’s monetary equiv-
alent would imply (€230 million is only 0.04% of 2016’s GDP of €653 billion),
but it was effective: 99% of the Dutch had drinking water connections by 1968
(Klostermann 2003).
In terms of mergers, the trends of the previous era were further encouraged by a
1971 amendment to the Drinking Water Law that restricted operating licenses to
DWCs with more than 100,000 customer-households (Klostermann 2003). At the
provincial level, Chapter III (1975) of the Drinking Water Law allowed provincial
governments to force local DWCs to merge, improving economies of scale and
service quality. The mergers also shifted the locus for subsidies from the national
level (via RID) to the provincial level. Uniform provincial tariffs meant that lower-
cost urban customers subsidized higher-cost rural customers. Figure 10 indicates
that over 100 DWCs were operating in the early 70s. By 1990, there were only 20
DWCs in the country, with eight of 12 provinces having only one DWC. Figure 11
shows the service areas for today’s total of 10 DWCs.
The campaign against water waste was pursued by installing more meters.
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Groningen wrote regulations requiring meters in the
1980s and 1990s (Blokland 1999). Metering penetration rose from roughly 50% in
1952 to around 96% in 2007 — a rate deﬁned as “universal” because the remaining
4% of residences were deemed “uneconomic” to connect (VEWIN 2012).4 Meters
were unpopular for their installation cost and occasional heavy-handed installation
deadlines, but they did not attract the same “anti-poor” criticisms as was seen in
4These statistics are based on the 1915–2007 editions of Vewin’s annualWaterleidingstatistiek (Water
supply statistics).
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England and Wales — probably because the Netherlands had public DWCs, an
adequate social safety net, and a culture that accepted meters as a fair means of
allocating costs (Klostermann 2003; Zetland 2016).
Dutch drinking water and sanitation systems were pervasive, effective and ef-
ﬁcient by 1990. Most of the population paid for clean safe water as a private good
and used as much as they wanted from well-funded and maintained systems; see
Fig. 12. The death rate had dropped to a “natural bottom,” and the infant mortality
rate was lower than ever (see Fig. 1). From this perspective, the industry only
needed to hold steady, but success raised expectations that DWCs should do —
and could do — more. At this point, we could discuss environmental policies,
Figure 11. (Color online) The Netherlands now has 10 DWCs
Source: VEWIN (2015).
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new social targets, and EU-level cooperation, but we won’t. The Dutch had
achieved water civilization.
8. Lessons Learned
This paper has explored the evolution of the Dutch drinking water sector, begin-
ning in the 1850s when a small share of the population could afford to buy water
by the bucket and ending in 1990 when everyone received clean, affordable water
in their homes. The sector’s evolution was neither chaotic nor predictable, but
linear in the sense that each change improved on current services, while adding
cost and complexity.
Our analytical narrative explained how changes in knowledge, culture, and
technology led to policies that altered the scale, scope and quality of water ser-
vices. To understand the pressure for change and impact of policies, we used a
framework that classiﬁed drinking water service as one of four types of good
(private, public, club or common-pool) and used this framework to explain the
evolution of the sector throughout eras in which emerging threats to the commons
are addressed by converting water services into another type of good (private, club
or public) that reduced that threat for the time being.
To recap our narrative, our ﬁrst era begins around 1850 with a desire to avoid
polluted common-pooled water. The solution to that desire — treating water ser-
vice as a private good — was successful until it was superseded by a desire around
1880 to extend service to all citizens in cities (to improve the commons of public
health), which meant treating water as a club good. That solution ignored citizens
in smaller communities who were also suffering from poor water services (thereby
undermining their common-pooled rights as citizens), so a push began around
1910 to provide water service as a public good for all. That solution resulted in
Figure 12. Water sales for both domestic and industrial users rose quickly after WWII
Source: Klostermann (2003).
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concerns about excess spending (depleting the budgetary commons), which led to
changes around 1950 in which water was treated as a private good. That move did not
mean returning to 1850s-style sales of water in a bucket. Advances in technology,
ﬁnance, and regulatory skill meant that “corporate” utilities could internalize the
costs of providing good services. Greater wealth and public understanding of the
importance of clean water meant that customers could be charged for their metered
water use. Our narrative ends in 1990 because everyone had access to adequate safe
water from companies with reliable operations and ﬁnances.
Can other countries learn from this unique Dutch experience? Yes, if they see
how drinking water can have different characteristics as a private, club, common-
pooled or public good, as these characteristics make it easier to choose a mix of
subsidies, regulation and information that will bring as much water to as many
people as possible. Yes, if they take a gradual, step-by-step approach to moving
from current conditions to viable goals. Yes, if they appreciate how discussions and
decisions must include all stakeholders — water managers, customers, taxpayers,
regulators, public health professionals, et al. It may take a village to raise a child,
but it takes a nation to deliver water civilization.
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